Indochina War Timeline: 1958-1960

1958
March
7^th	Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs recommends that the UK, Canada, France and India be sounded out about increasing the number of MAAG personnel
June
7^th	Walter Robertson sends a letter to the Secretary of State stressing the need to abolish the 342 ceiling on MAAG personnel and explains, "...for some time now only a handful of TERM personnel has been engaged in the original mission of equipment salvage. Practically, the duties of most TERM personnel are indistinguishable from those of the MAAG personnel."
July
14^th	MAAG objects to ARVN plans to open a Commando Training School a Nha Trang
August
12^th	Thirty Binh Xuyen members are killed during their attack on the Michelin rubber plantations
1959
January
	North Vietnam's Central Executive Committee issues Resolution 15, changing its strategy from “Political struggle” to "“armed struggle"
April
4^th	President Eisenhower makes his first commitment to maintain South Vietnam as a separate National State
May
19^th	North Vietnamese high command organizes the 559th Transportation Group to construct and maintain a route for infiltration into South Vietnam. The route would become known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail and facilitated the movement of troops and transportation of supplies from North of the DMZ.
25^th	Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) extends the advisory and training operation in Vietnam as follows: Provide MAAG advisors down to and including Infantry Regimental level and Artillery, Armored and separate Marine Battalion level. Place the advisors in the field with the HQ of the units being advised in order to furnish advice on the preparation of daily plans, monitor the day-to-day conduct of operations and render on the spot advice based on the situation as it exists at the time. This will include tactical advice as well as that provided on logistical matters, including medical support problems, the evacuation of the wounded, transportation problems, road and rail construction, bridging supply procedures, maintenance of equipment etc. Evaluate Vietnamese requests for additional equipment, road building materials, heavy engineering equipment etc. in the light of the direct observations of the on-the-spot advisors as well as upon other information available. Evaluate the level of cooperation and coordination among Vietnamese Army, Navy and Air Force elements and take necessary corrective action with Vietnamese officials in those instances where deficiencies are reported by on-the-spot advisors. The activities of MAAG Advisors must be limited to advisory functions and under no circumstances shall they participate directly in combat operations nor will they accompany units on anti-guerrilla operations in areas immediately adjacent to national boundaries.
July
7^th	Saigon embassy informed that the DoD is considering detailing U.S. Army Special Forces teams to MAAG Viet-Nam to act as advisors on anti-guerrilla tactics
8^th	Viet Cong guerrillas armed with small arms and home made bombs attack the U.S. 7th Infantry Advisory Detachment at Bien Hoa. American advisors Major Dale Buis and Master Sergeant Chester Ovnard, who were watching a movie in the mess hall, are killed along with a Vietnamese mess attendant and an ARVN soldier. One VC member was also killed.
August
	10 ARVN officers attend the British Jungle Warfare School in Johor, Malaya
30^th	90% of voters turn out in elections for the National Assembly in South Vietnam The election results are: National Revolutionary Movement: 78 seats Independents: 36 seats Socialist: 4 seats Social Democrats: 3 seats Vietnam Restoration Party: 2 seats
1960
February
15^th	CINCPAC argues against using U.S. Special Forces teams to train the Vietnamese civil guard because: If overt it would violate the MAAG / TERM ceiling If covert, experience in Laos has shown the difficulty in maintaining plausibility of such cover Instead, Admiral Felt believes the training of selected Vietnamese civil guard personnel on Okinawa by Special Forces instructors is the only practical and feasible solution
19^th	Elbridge Durbrow, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, strongly recommends that U.S. Army Special Forces be assigned to USARMA (United States Army Attaché) Saigon, to give anti-guerrilla training to the Vietnamese civil guard. He indicates that GVN is agreeable to this extension of USARAMA activities and regards this type of training as an urgent need. Edward Lansdale informs John Irwin, Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, that the Office for Special Operations (OSO) concurs with Durbrow’s recommendation.
27^th	President Diem states he is anxious to have sufficient numbers of U.S. Army Special Forces personnel brought in to train both the Civil Guard and ARVN.
March
11^th	Secretary of Defense notifies CINCPAC that from April 1^st personnel arriving in Viet-Nam will no longer be assigned to TERM and that the mission will be phased out by 31^st December 1960
30^th	The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reverse MAAG policy by deciding that the Army of Vietnam should develop an anti-guerrilla capability within the regular force structure
April
	North Vietnam imposes universal military conscription and begins infiltration of cadres in to the South
May
5^th	U.S. announces an increase in the number of MAAG advisors above the Geneva imposed ceiling of 342
September
1^st	Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr replaces General Samuel Williams as Chief of MAAG-Vietnam
November
9^th	Senator John F. Kennedy narrowly defeats Vice President Richard M. Nixon in the U.S. Presidential election
11^th	South Vietnamese paratroopers stage a failed coup d’état against President Ngo Dinh Diem
December
20^th	National Liberation Front of South Vietnam forms with the aim of overthrowing Diem’s government and reunifying the country
31^st	Approximately 900 U.S. Military personnel now in South Vietnam

1956-1957 1961-1962